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www.ca.gov

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DNSSEC options (hide)
  1. |?|
  2. |?|
  3. |?|
  4. |?|
  5. |?|
  6. |?|
  7. |?|
  8. |?|
  9. |?|
  10. |?|
Notices
DNSSEC Authentication Chain

RRset statusRRset status

Insecure (6)
  • akamaiedge.net/SOA
  • e65017.dscb.akamaiedge.net/A
  • e65017.dscb.akamaiedge.net/AAAA
  • e65017.dscb.akamaiedge.net/AAAA
  • www.ca.gov.edgekey.net/CNAME
  • www.ca.gov/CNAME
Secure (3)
  • gov/SOA
  • net/SOA
  • net/SOA

DNSKEY/DS/NSEC statusDNSKEY/DS/NSEC status

Secure (12)
  • ./DNSKEY (alg 8, id 20326)
  • ./DNSKEY (alg 8, id 26116)
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of akamaiedge.net/DS
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of ca.gov/DS
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of edgekey.net/DS
  • gov/DNSKEY (alg 8, id 15489)
  • gov/DNSKEY (alg 8, id 7698)
  • gov/DS (alg 8, id 7698)
  • gov/DS (alg 8, id 7698)
  • net/DNSKEY (alg 8, id 15314)
  • net/DNSKEY (alg 8, id 35886)
  • net/DS (alg 8, id 35886)

Delegation statusDelegation status

Insecure (4)
  • akamaiedge.net to dscb.akamaiedge.net
  • gov to ca.gov
  • net to akamaiedge.net
  • net to edgekey.net
Secure (2)
  • . to gov
  • . to net

NoticesNotices

Errors (2)
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of ca.gov/DS: An iterations count of 0 must be used in NSEC3 records to alleviate computational burdens. See RFC 9276, Sec. 3.1.
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of ca.gov/DS: An iterations count of 0 must be used in NSEC3 records to alleviate computational burdens. See RFC 9276, Sec. 3.1.
Warnings (11)
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of ca.gov/DS: The salt value for an NSEC3 record should be empty. See RFC 9276, Sec. 3.1.
  • NSEC3 proving non-existence of ca.gov/DS: The salt value for an NSEC3 record should be empty. See RFC 9276, Sec. 3.1.
  • gov/DS (alg 8, id 7698): DNSSEC implementers are prohibited from implementing signing with DS algorithm 1 (SHA-1). See RFC 8624, Sec. 3.2.
  • gov/DS (alg 8, id 7698): DNSSEC implementers are prohibited from implementing signing with DS algorithm 1 (SHA-1). See RFC 8624, Sec. 3.2.
  • gov/DS (alg 8, id 7698): DS records with digest type 1 (SHA-1) are ignored when DS records with digest type 2 (SHA-256) exist in the same RRset. See RFC 4509, Sec. 3.
  • gov/DS (alg 8, id 7698): DS records with digest type 1 (SHA-1) are ignored when DS records with digest type 2 (SHA-256) exist in the same RRset. See RFC 4509, Sec. 3.
  • net to akamaiedge.net: Authoritative AAAA records exist for a11-192.akamaiedge.net, but there are no corresponding AAAA glue records. See RFC 1034, Sec. 4.2.2.
  • net to edgekey.net: Authoritative AAAA records exist for a13-65.akam.net, but there are no corresponding AAAA glue records. See RFC 1034, Sec. 4.2.2.
  • net to edgekey.net: Authoritative AAAA records exist for a5-65.akam.net, but there are no corresponding AAAA glue records. See RFC 1034, Sec. 4.2.2.
  • net to edgekey.net: The following NS name(s) were found in the authoritative NS RRset, but not in the delegation NS RRset (i.e., in the net zone): a11-65.akam.net, ns1-2.akam.net, a9-65.akam.net, a3-65.akam.net See RFC 1034, Sec. 4.2.2.
  • net to edgekey.net: The following NS name(s) were found in the delegation NS RRset (i.e., in the net zone), but not in the authoritative NS RRset: ns1-66.akam.net, ns4-66.akam.net, ns5-66.akam.net, ns7-65.akam.net See RFC 1034, Sec. 4.2.2.

DNSKEY legend

Full legend
SEP bit setSEP bit set
Revoke bit setRevoke bit set
Trust anchorTrust anchor
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DNSSEC authentication graph